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For Shamir’s secret key sharing algorithm, we develop the procedure for detection of faulty
shares. This procedure consists of the error locator polynomial construction for the data set
{(xj , yj)}Nj=1 with y values generated from x ones by a polynomial interpolant of a degree
n < N − 1 with possible occurrence of some errors. The error locator polynomial is sought
out in the form of an appropriate Hankel polynomial
HL(x; {τ}) :=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τ0 τ1 τ2 . . . τL
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1. Introduction. Let the secret integer number (key) S should be split into N pieces,
i. e. integers S1, . . . , SN (shares) should be created to be distributed between the N distinct
members of some consortium (shareholders). The sharing should be organized in such a
way that, for a given number k < N (threshold), the key S can be restored from any
subset of k shares Si1 , . . . , Sik , but cannot be restored from a fewer number of shares. The
secret S, as well as computation of its shares and their distribution between the consortium
members, are entrusted to an honest dealer.
Several constructive schemes were suggested for the secret share management like, for
instance, those based on multidimensional hyperplane intersection or Chinese Remainder
Theorem. In the present paper we deal with Shamir’s algorithm [1] based on solution of
the polynomial interpolation problem. The classical univariate polynomial interpolation
problem (over an infinite field, say R) is formulated as follows. Given the data set of values
for the variables x and y
x x1 x2 . . . xN
y y1 y2 . . . yN
, {xj , yj}Nj=1 ⊂ R, (1)
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with distinct nodes {xj}Nj=1, find a polynomial f(x) such that {f(xj) = yj}Nj=1. If deg f 





(x− xj), Wj(x) := W (x)
x− xj for j ∈ {1, . . . , N} .














In Shamir’s algorithm, to share the secret key S, the dealer first chooses an arbitrary
prime number p > S, p n and constructs arbitrary polynomial over Zp:
f(x) := S + a1x + a2x2 + · · ·+ ak−1xk−1, {a1, . . . , ak−1} ⊂ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} . (3)
Next he enumerates the members of the consortium by consecutive integers 1, 2, . . . , n and
supplies the j-th of them with the value yj := f(j) (mod p), with this value treated as the
j-th share of the secret value S. To restore the secret S, the shareholders needs to collect
at least k pares (j, yj). Lagrange formula (2) computes the polynomial (3) modulo p; its
free term coincides with S. The only specifics of computation in Zp is that the division
operation by the integers involved in (2) should be interpreted as computation of inversion
of these integers modulo p.
The algorithm fails if one of the shares is corrupted (accidentally or intentionally)
either in transmission or at storage. Assuming that the number of uncorrupted shares
exceeds that of corrupted ones, is it possible to restore the secret S? We will demonstrate
that the answer is positive if some redundancy in the number of true shares over false ones
can be guaranteed.
2. Error detection in interpolation table. In the present section we detail the
algorithm of error location dealing with the interpolation problem over R, while in the
next one it is modified for Zp.
Theorem 1 (Euler, Lagrange). For the polynomial F (x) ∈ R[x] with the leading







0, if degF < N − 1,
A0, if degF = N − 1. (4)
If the data set (1) is generated by a polynomial of a degree n < N − 1 then the set
is redundant for computation of this polynomial. Any subset of the data set containing
n + 1 entries is sufficient for the polynomial restoration.







for  ∈ {0, 1, . . .} . (5)
The following result is a trivial consequence of theorem 1.
Theorem 2. If the data set (1) is generated by a polynomial of a degree n < N − 1,
then
τ0 = 0, . . . , τN−n−2 = 0, τN−n−1 = 0 . (6)
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Suppose now that some of the values y1, . . . , yN generated by a polynomial of a degree
n < N − 1 are corrupted, but we do know neither their amount nor their position. One
may then expect that generically the degree of the interpolant formally constructed by
(2) would be greater than n, and, therefore, some of equalities (6) would be violated. This
provides one with a sufficient condition for the existence of an error in the data set.
In order to locate the erroneous values, generate by (5) the two sequences of Hankel
determinants :
HL({τ}) := det [τi+j−2]Li,j=1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τ0 τ1 τ2 . . . τL−1









HL(x; {τ}) := det [τi+j−2x− τi+j−1]Li,j=1
for L ∈ N. The last determinant can be represented in an alternative form as
HL(x; {τ}) ≡
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τ0 τ1 τ2 . . . τL





τL−1 τL τL+1 . . . τ2L−1




and is sometimes referred to as the L-th Hankel polynomial generated by (5).
Example 1. The data set
x −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
y 30 12 8 9 18 35 60
is generated by the polynomial f(x) = 4 x2−3 x+8 with the exception of a single erroneous
value at the node x2 = −1. The sequence of polynomials (7) is as follows:
H1(x; {τ}) ≡ 140(x + 1), H2(x; {τ}) ≡ 0, H3(x; {τ}) ≡ −
2
5
(x + 1), . . .
and one may watch the expression for the error position as a zero of both polynomials
H1(x; {τ}) and H3(x; {τ}).
Theorem 3. Let e ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. Let the polynomial f(x) = a0xn + · · · + an be of
a degree n < N − 2. Let the data set (1) satisfy the conditions
(a) yj = f(xj) for j ∈ {1, . . . , N} \ {e},
(b) ŷe := f(xe) = ye,
then
H1(x; {τ}) ≡ (ye − ŷe)
W ′(xe)
(x − xe) . (8)








































for  ∈ {0, 1} .
Thus,
H1(x; {τ}) ≡
∣∣∣∣ τ0 τ11 x
∣∣∣∣ ≡ ∣∣∣∣ ε/W ′(x1) εx1/W ′(x1)1 x
∣∣∣∣ = εW ′(x1) (x− x1) ,
and (8) is proved.
We now turn to the case of the occurrence of several errors in the data set. We denote
the number of erroneous values by E.
Example 2. The data set
x −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
y 30 −7 8 9 11 35 60
is generated by the polynomial f(x) := 4 x2 − 3 x+ 8 with the exception of two erroneous
values at x2 = −1 and x5 = 2. The sequence of polynomials (7) is as follows:
H1(x; {τ}) ≡ 180(3 x + 38), H2(x; {τ}) ≡ −
77
320
(x + 1)(x− 2), . . .
and this time the erroneous nodes are detected as the zeros of the polynomial H2(x; {τ}).
Theorem 4. Let E ∈ {2, 3, . . . , N/2 − 1} and e1, . . . , eE be distinct numbers from
{1, 2, . . . , N}. Let polynomial f(x) be of a degree n < N − 2E. Let the set (1) satisfy the
conditions
(a) yj = f(xj) for j ∈ {1, . . . , N} \ {e1, . . . , eE},














(x− xes) . (9)








, where εj := yj − ŷj for j ∈ {1, . . . , E},  ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} .














= θ for  ∈ {0, . . . , N − n− 2} .
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Rewrite the expression for HE(x; {τ}):
HE(x; {τ}) ≡ HE(x; {θ}) ≡
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ0 θ1 . . . θE−1 θE





θE−1 θE . . . θ2E−2 θ2E−1
1 x . . . xE−1 xE
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.










θ0 θ1 . . . θE−1 θE



































θ0 θ1 . . . θE−1 θE





θE−1 θE . . . θ2E−2 θ2E−1
θ−1 θ . . . θ+E−2 θ+E−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 0 for  ∈ {1, . . . , E} .
These relationships compose the system of E homogeneous linear equations connecting
































does not vanish due to the assumption (b) of the theorem. Therefore all the values
{HE(xs; {θ})}Es=1 should be equal zero and




for some constant C ∈ R. It turns out that the expression for the leading coefficient of
HE(x; {θ}) looks similar to (10):∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ0 θ1 . . . θE−1








1 1 . . . 1
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×∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ε1/W
′(x1) 0 . . . 0
ε2/W





0 0 . . . εE/W ′(xE)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 x1 . . . xE−11

















This concludes the proof of (9).
The upper bound for the number of potential errors in the data set (1) from theorem 4
should be considered as a tight one. This claim is demonstrated by the following example.
Example 3. The occurrence of three errors in the data set
x −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
y 30 −7 8 9 11 −1 60
generated by the polynomial f(x) := 4 x2−3 x+8 does not permit one to uniquely restore
this polynomial. Indeed, the faulty table can be interpreted as the one obtained from
x −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
y −31 −7 8 14 11 −1 −22
originated by the polynomial f1(x) := −9/2 x2 + 21/2 x+ 8 and further corrupted in the
values f1(−2), f1(1) and f1(4).
R e m a r k 1. The developed approach for the error detection has a definite rela-
tionship to Coding Theory and specifically to the Berlekamp—Welch algorithm for error
correction in Reed—Solomon codes [2]. In the framework of this algorithm, the polynomial
(9) is referred to as the error locator polynomial, and is found via the solution of the rational
interpolation problem for the data set (1). In the papers [3, 4] the Jacobi’s approach
for resolving the rational interpolation problem is developed consisting in independent
computation of numerator and denominator of the interpolant. Computation of the error
locator polynomial (9) via its representation in the Hankel polynomial form (7) is a part
of that algorithm.
We conclude the present section with two extra results that aim to optimize the
computational aspects of the suggested algorithm. Their proofs and further related
references can be found in [3, 4].
Theorem 5. Let the conditions of theorem 4 be fulfilled. If n := deg f < N − 2E− 1,
then
HN−n−E−1(x; {τ}) ≡ CHE(x; {τ})
for some constant C = 0. If n < N − 2E − 2, then
HE+1(x; {τ}) ≡ 0, . . . ,HN−n−E−2(x; {τ}) ≡ 0 .
The polynomial HL(x; {τ}) should be interpreted as a suspicious to be the error
locator one if the polynomial HL+1(x; {τ}) is identically zero or coincides with HL(x; {τ})
up to a numerical factor. Example 1 demonstrates this effect.
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For a small number of expected errors, computation of the sequence of Hankel
polynomials required for their detection, does not cause difficulties. As for the larger
orders, one might expect that the algebraic time complexity for the computation of a
parameter dependent determinant (7) is as great as that for the characteristic polynomial
of the integer matrix, i. e. O(n3) (with n standing for the length of input). Fortunately, the
Hankel structure of the determinant (7) allows one to diminish this estimation. Represent
the L-th Hankel polynomial generated by any sequence {c} = {c0, c1, . . . , } in canonical
form
HL(x; {c}) ≡ hL0xL + hL1xL−1 + · · ·+ hLL with hL0 = HL({c}) .
Theorem 6. Any three consecutive Hankel polynomials
HL−2(x; {c}), HL−1(x; {c}), HL(x; {c})
are connected by the identity
H2LHL−2(x; {c}) + (HLhL−1,1 −HL−1hL1 −HLHL−1x)HL−1(x; {c}) +
+ H2L−1HL(x; {c}) ≡ 0 . (11)
In the case HL−1 = 0, the identity (11) reduces the computation of HL(x; {c}) to
that of HL−1(x; {c}) and HL−2(x; {c}). Similar statement is also valid for the constants
involved in (11), i. e. they can be expressed via the coefficients of those polynomials:{
hL0 = HL = cL−1hL−1,L−1 + cLhL−1,L−2 + · · ·+ c2L−2hL−1,0 ,
hL1 = −(cLhL−1,L−1 + cL+1hL−1,L−2 + · · ·+ c2L−1hL−1,0) .
Thus, the complexity of the recursive procedure for computing the sequence of Hankel
polynomials can be estimated as O(n2).
3. Error detection in the sequence of shares.
Example 4. Let the secret key S = 1234 has been distributed between N = 7
shareholders with k = 3 threshold. The dealer set p = 2017 and generated the shares
{yj = f(j) (mod p)}7j=1 with f(x) := 1234 + 271 x+ 82 x2 .
However, later on, the attempts to restore the secret via the selection of several distinct
triples of the consortium shareholders fail. On collecting together all the shares the result
is as follows:
j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
y 1587 350 768 1613 605 778 1098
Under assumption that the number of faulty shares does not exceed 2, detect them and
restore the secret S.
Solution. Due to the claim of theorem 4, to correct up to 2 potential errors in the
table, it is sufficient to compute 4 numbers τj . We first perform the computations with
rational numbers and at the final stage convert them to integers. Since the values
τ0 = −3937180 , τ1 = −
1801
18
, τ2 = −3833390 , τ3 = −
79132
45
are non zero, theorem 2 indicates the presence of error in the given data set. To locate
them, we compute Hankel polynomials (7). The polynomial
H1(x; {τ}) = 1180(−3937 x+ 18010) ≡p 1199(−3937 x+ 18010) ≡p 1334 x− 12
does not have zeros in {1, . . . , 7}. Next polynomial
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H2(x; {τ}) ≡p 156 x2 + 769 x + 1872 ≡p 156(x2 + 2009 x+ 12) ≡p 156(x− 2)(x− 6)
possesses two zeros in this set. Therefore, the shares corresponding to j = 2 and j = 6
should be considered as erroneous. Taking any three of the five remained values for j, one
can restore the polynomial f(x).
R e m a r k 2. As a matter of fact, to restore S from the subset of true shares, we
are in need of solely the free term of the corresponding interpolation polynomial. It is worth
mentioning that it directly relates to the values (5). For instance, in the case of reliability





provided that {xj = 0}Nj=1.
If the error locator polynomial is of a degree E then its canonical form modulo p can
always be chosen with the sequence of coefficients with alternation in signs, i. e.
HE(x; {τ}) ≡p c(xE − b1xE−1 + b2xE−2 − · · ·+ (−1)EbE) ,
where {c, b1, b2, . . . , bE} ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , p − 1}. This permits one to reduce the problem of
resolving an algebraic equation over Zp to that of finding positive integer zeros for a
polynomial with integer coefficients. The latter is resolved via checking the divisors of bE .
4. Conclusion. We have suggested an approach for the detection of faulty shares
in Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. The developed algorithm might be useful in the
decentralized voting protocol management.
The authors thank the referees for valuable suggestions that helped to improve the
quality of the paper.
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https://doi.org/10.21638/11702/spbu10.2019.210 (In English)
Для схемы Шамира разделения секрета предлагается процедура обнаружения ошибоч-
ных долей секрета. Разработан алгоритм построения полинома локаторов ошибок для
набора данных {(xj , yj)}Nj=1, в котором значения yj , изначально генерируемые из xj
посредством полиномиального интерполянта степени n < N − 1, подвергаются частич-
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ганкелевы полиномы, исправление ошибок.
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